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DOING JUSTICE IN A
BUREAUCRACY: THE NEED TO
RECONCILE CONTEMPORARY




Among the most significant changes in the contemporary judicial scene
have been those relating to a judge's managerial and administrative re-
sponsibilities. Written commentaries by and for judges have stressed the
need for judges to become active administrators to cope with burgeoning
caseloads and the increasing complexity of modern litigation.' Some have
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University; A.B. 1965, Co-
lumbia College; J.D. 1972, Northwestern University. I am indebted to Roger Hanson,
Anthony Herman, Steven Lubet, Mack Player, Jack Van Doren and Jeffrey Shaman,
for their comments on earlier versions of this paper and to Deborah Glover and
Linda Griffiths for their research assistance.
Unreported determinations and orders of state judicial conduct commissions
cited in part II of this Article are on file with the author and the Center for
Judicial Conduct Organizations of the American Judicature Society in Chicago.
1. See, e.g., S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT
IN THE UN TED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1977); Berg, Judicial Interest in Admin-
istration: The Critical Variable, 57 JuDIcATuRn 251 (1974); Peckham, The Federal
Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to
Disposition, 69 CALim. L. Rnv. 770 (1981). The writings of Arthur Vanderbilt (e.g.,
A. VANDERBILT, MINimsu STANDARDS OF JuDicriL ADMINiSTRATION (1949)) and the
judicial reforms effected in New Jersey following the adoption of its new constitution
in 1947 while Vanderbilt was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
are often cited as among the more prominent influences in bringing about acceptance
of, and increased attention to, the managerial role. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey recently had occasion to explain the significance of Chief Justice Vanderbilt's
requirement that weekly reports be filed by each trial judge: "symbolically it signified
that there was another dimension to judging, a dimension of administrative re-
sponsibility imposed on every judge; he or she was not only to judge well but to
work well, and to do whatever was necessary to assure that the entire system was
functioning properly." In re Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 99, 494 A.2d 1014, 1017 (1985).
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criticized this increased prominence accorded to the managerial role,2 and
others have characterized it as an inevitable, though troublesome, conse-
quence of judicial bureaucratization. 3 To date, this commentary on judicial
bureaucratization and managerial judging has centered on the federal ju-
diciary and has discussed problems and pathologies resulting from bur-
eaucratization at different levels of the federal judicial system.'
This Article focuses on state judicial bureaucracies and argues that
bureaucratization of the state judiciaries may result in a pathology-judicial
role strain-that the debate over the bureaucratization of the federal ju-
diciary has not identified. Part I will illustrate that, unlike the federal
judicial bureaucracy, the state judicial bureaucracies are generally char-
acterized by strong hierarchical relationships and a sanctioning system to
enforce administrative imperatives. Through an analysis of the emerging
body of caselaw charging judges with violations of relevant ethics provisions,
part II will show that such a bureaucratic setting gives emphasis and
prominence to managerial and administrative roles. Pathologies and dys-
functions resulting from the contemporary emphasis on these multiple
judicial roles are explored in part III, leading to the conclusion in part
IV that state high courts have not taken advantage of the opportunities
that these cases provide to clarify role ambiguities and resolve role conflicts.
Part IV further suggests that state judicial heirarchies should take affirmative
steps to address the role strain problem through the establishment of case
production limits.
I. STATE AND FEDERAL JuDCuAL BuREAucRAcms
In his comprehensive analysis of judicial bureaucratization, Owen Fiss
argues that the modern judiciary must be viewed as a large-scale, highly
complex organization with a number of hierarchical relationships.5 Focusing
on the federal judicial system, he identifies three hierarchical relationships:
judge-judge, judge-staff, and judge-subjudge. Fiss' analysis seeks to de-
2. See, e.g., Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HAav. L. Rnv. 374 (1982). But
see Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINOS L.J.
505 (1984).
3. Edwards, A Judge's View on Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method,
80 MICH. L. Rnv. 259 (1981); Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92
YALE L.J. 1442 (1983); Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-The Carcinoma of the Ju-
diciary, 31 ALA. L. REv. 261 (1980); McCree, Bureaucratic Justice: An Early
Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 777 (1981); Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal
Courts: The Tension Between Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAm L. Rnv. 648
(1980); Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MicH L. REv. 248
(1981); Wald, Bureaucracy and the Courts, 92 YALE L.J. 1478 (1983).
4. E.g., Resnik, supra note 2; Flanders, supra note 2; Higginbotham, supra
note 3 (attention on the federal trial judiciary). Cf. Vining, supra note 3 (analysis
limited to the Supreme Court of the United States).
5. Fiss, supra note 3.
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termine whether these bureaucratic relationships lead to dysfunctions or
pathologies that threaten the judicial process. After concluding that the
judge-judge relationship is the least salient and therefore poses less of a
threat, Fiss focuses on the judge-staff and judge-subjudge relationships.
Drawing primarily on the writings of Hannah Arendt,6 Fiss finds that these
relationships may result in two bureaucratic pathologies: insulation of the
judge from critical educational experiences that are vital to the adjudicative
process and diffusion of responsibility for judicial decision making.7
Application of the Fiss analysis to state judicial bureaucracies yields
somewhat different results. Although the state judiciary theoretically may
be subject to the same pathologies as the federal judiciary, the judge-staff
and judge-subjudge relationships are not nearly as significant in state judicial
systems, particularly at the trial level, as they are in the federal judicial
system. Most state trial judges, unlike federal district court judges, do not
have elbow clerks, nor are they able to delegate judging responsibilities to
subjudges whose authority parallels that of the federal magistrates. On the
other hand, the judge-judge relationship tends to be much stronger in state
judiciaries than it is in the federal judiciary. Indeed, the hierarchical
relationships among state court judges, particularly in matters relating to
a judge's managerial responsibilities, are so powerful that they should be
given primary attention in an analysis of state judicial bureaucracies.
Of particular significance in creating and strengthening hierarchical
relationships among judges in state judicial systems has been the court
unification movement. Initially proposed by Roscoe Pound in a now famous
address at the 1906 annual convention of the American Bar Association,
the unified court system concept calls for consolidation of all state trial
and appellate courts into a single hierarchical organization with an ad-
ministrator at the top of the judicial hierarchy who has the power to direct
the court's agencies and personnel for speedy case disposition and to make
6. See, e.g., H. ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE IN CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 103,
137-38 (1972); H. ARENDT, EIcImNN IN JERUsALEm: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY
OF Evn (1965); H. AENDT, THE HuMAN CONDITION 40, 44-45 (1958). In choosing
Arendt's approach, Fiss dismisses the model of bureaucracy advanced by Max
Weber as having "little import for the judicial bureaucracy." Fiss, supra note 3,
at 1450. Weber emphasized the prevalence of rule-governed behavior in a bureauc-
racy. M. WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: EssAYs IN SOCIOLOGY (H. Gerth & C. Mills
eds. 1946) (chap. entitled Bureaucracy). Thus, the bureaucratic pathology that would
be associated with the Weberian model would be excessively rigid, rule-bound
behavior. Fiss points out that Weber described the legal method of England and
America as "empirical justice" rather than bureaucratic. Fiss, supra note 3, at
1450.
7. Fiss, supra note 3, at 1454-58, finds the relationships between the federal
judge and the judge's elbow clerks (staff) and the federal judge and the federal
magistrate (subjudge) most troubling.
1989]
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necessary organizational adjustments to meet current workloads.8 Pound
believed that such organizational arrangements would permit the courts to
become more efficient and businesslike and thus better able to adjust to
the needs of a rapidly urbanizing society. 9 It was not until after World
War II, however, that many state judiciaries, largely through adoption of
new judicial articles in state constitutions, were reorganized in keeping with
Pound's unified court idea. 10
Among the most salient features of a unified state court system are
centralized management through the vesting of ultimate administrative au-
thority for the entire judicial system in the chief justice of the state's court
of last resort and the granting of procedural and administrative rule-making
authority to the high court." The chief justice and high court preside over
a hierarchy comprised of chief judges of trial and intermediate appellate
courts, who in turn exercise administrative authority over individual judges
with regard to their day-to-day case management and administrative re-
sponsibilities.1 2
The case management and administrative responsibilities of individual
state court judges are codified in Canon 3 of the American Bar Association's
8. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice, reprinted in 46 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 55 (1962). Pound developed the
court unification concept in greater detail in Pound, Principles and Outline of a
Modern Unified Court Organization, 23 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 225 (1940). Court
unification has been recommended and promoted in various national standards,
most notably and consistently by the American Bar Association in its Report of
the Section of Judicial Administration, 63 A.B.A. REP. 522 (1938); Model State
Judicial Article, 87 A.B.A. REP. 392-99 (1962); and COURT OROANIZATION STAN-
DADs (1974). For a detailed explanation of the court unification concept and its
history, see Ashman & Parness, The Concept of a Unified Court System, 24 DE
PAUL L. REv. 1 (1974).
9. Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARv.
L. REv. 302 (1913).
10. For accounts of these developments and analyses of the extent to which
various state court systems have achieved unification, see L. BEnxsON & S. CARBON,
COURT UNIFICATION: HISTORY, POLITICS AND IMPLEMENTATION (1978); Berkson Uni-
fied Court Systems: A Ranking of the States, 3 JUST. Sys. J. 264 (1978); Lowe,
Unified Courts in America: The Legacy of Roscoe Pound, 56 J. AM. JuD. Soc'r
316 (1973).
11. Carbon, Berkson & Rosenbaum, Court Reform in the Twentieth Century:
A Critique of the Court Unification Controversy, 27 EMoRY L.J. 559 (1978).
Although the centralized management concept has been opposed by some com-
mentators and state court administrators, the opposition has largely centered on
systemic concerns rather than concerns over the effect of bureaucratization on
judicial decision-making and behavior. Id. at 578-86. See also Gallas, The Con-
ventional Wisdom of State Court Administration: A Critical Assessment and an
Alternative Approach, 2 JUST. Sys. J. 35 (1976); Saari, Modern Court Management:
Trends in Court Organization Concepts-1976, 2 JUST. SYs. J. 19 (1976); Comment,
Trial Court Administration in California, 21 UCLA L. REv. 1081 (1974).
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Code of Judicial Conduct, which calls upon a judge to "perform the duties
of his office impartially and diligently".'3 Canons 3A(5)' 4 and 3B partic-
ularize this diligence requirement.1 5 Canon 3A(5) requires judges to dispose
promptly of their court's business, while Canon 3B imposes on judges a
diligence requirement not only with regard to their own administrative
responsibilities, but also with regard to those of other court officials and
staff who are subject to their direction and control.
Although these managerial and administrative imperatives apply to the
federal judiciary as well as almost all state judiciaries,' 6 they have more
force in the state judicial systems. This is so not only because of their
stronger judge-judge hierarchical administrative relationships, but also be-
cause state judges (unlike federal judges) can be sanctioned with some
severity for failure to adhere to these ethics provisions. All fifty states and
the District of Columbia have mechanisms other than impeachment for
sanctioning judges for misconduct. 17 The basis of these sanctioning systems
is a body-generally referred to as a judicial conduct commission-with
the authority to receive and investigate complaints against judges and
conduct initial hearings.
A relatively recent development, the first modern judicial conduct
commission was established in California in 1961.11 Although some of these
13. CODE OF JUDICrA. CONDUCT, Canon 3 (1972) [hereinafter CODE] (emphasis
added).
14. "A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court." Id.
at 3A(5).
15. Canon 3B provides:
(1) A judge should diligently discharge his administrative responsibilities,
maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and facilitate
the performance of the administrative responsibilities of other judges and
court officials.
(2) A judge should require his staff and court officials subject to his
direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence
that apply to him.
(3) A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against
a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may
become aware.
(4) A judge should not make unnecessary appointments. He should exercise
his power of appointment only on the basis of merit, avoiding nepotism
and favoritism. He should not approve of compensation of appointees
beyond the fair value of services rendered.
Id. at 3B.
16. The Code has been adopted in whole or in part by 47 states, the District
of Columbia and the Federal Judicial Conference. The three non-Code states are
Montana, Rhode Island and Wisconsin. Shaman, Two States Adopt ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, 8 JuD. CONDUCT REP. 1 (1987).
17. I. TEsrrOR & D. SINKs, JUDICrAL CONDUCT ORGAIZATONS (1980).
18. For a general history of the movement to establish judicial conduct
commissions, see Schoenbaum, A Historical Look at Judicial Discipline, 54 Cm.-]
KENT L. RPv. 1 (1977).
19891
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bodies have the authority to issue sanctions, most recommend sanctions
to a final reviewing authority, usually the state's highest appellate court. 9
In most states, the high court has the authority not only to apply sanctions
such as the reprimand, censure, or suspension of a judge, but also to order
the retirement or removal of a judge from office.20
In contrast to the state judicial systems, Fiss cites "the absence of any
sanctioning system" in the federal judicial bureaucracy to support his
contention that the hierarchical relationships among federal judges are
weak. 2' Although a mechanism for sanctioning federal judges for Code
violations has existed since 1980 ,n the range of available penalties does
not include removal from office and Fiss sees it as a "symbol of the
weakness of the controls of one [federal] judge over another. '23
Because the judge-judge hierarchical relationships in the state judiciaries
are considerably stronger than they are in the federal system, the likelihood
of bureaucratic dysfunctions or pathologies that adversely affect the states'
judicial processes is greater. The analysis in part II of this Article of the
emerging caselaw applying and interpreting state judicial administrative and
ethical imperatives demonstrates the increasing importance accorded to
administrative and managerial roles. Such an analysis also provides a
microscope for examing the bureaucratic pathologies that may develop
in the state judiciaries and their potential effect on the judicial role.
This emerging body of caselaw enforcing the administrative imperatives
imposed on state judges underscores the emphasis that state judicial bu-
reaucracies are placing on judges' managerial and administrative roles.
Although the conduct of the judges in most of the cases decided to date
has been egregious, the opinions of the judicial conduct commissions and
19. I. TEsrroR & D. Snxs, supra note 17, at 12-18.
20. Id. at 44-46.
21. Fiss, supra note 3, at 1445.
22. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2036 (1980). Under this statute, the judicial
councils of the federal circuits have the power to investigate complaints against
federal judges and take "action as is appropriate to assure the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts," including certifying ajudge's disability, requesting that a judge retire, ordering that no further cases be
assigned to the judge as a temporary measure, and censuring or reprimanding thejudge publicly or privately. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(B) (1986). The judicial council
may also refer a complaint to the Judicial Conference of the United States to
consider whether the matter should be referred to the House of Representatives
for impeachment proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(7). One case that reached the
House of Representatives after going through these steps is that of Judge Alcee
Hastings. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1988, at 11, col. 1. For a fuller description of the
process as it relates to the Hastings case and a thoughtful defense of current federal
impeachment procedures, see Note, In Defense of the Constitution's Judicial Im-
peachment Standard, 86 MicH. L. RIv. 420 (1987).
23. Fiss, supra note 3, at 1445.
[Vol. 54
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state high courts in sanctioning these judges sends a clear message: the
managerial and administrative responsibilities of judges are not to be taken
lightly. Judges are to approach these roles with the same degree of seri-
ousness as they approach their adjudicatory role.
II. MANAGEuAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ROLES IN STATE JUDICIAL
BUREAUCRACIES
A. The Judge as Case Manager
Much of the caselaw charging judges with violations of administrative
imperatives reflects the increased emphasis accorded to the case management
role. Requirements such as time standards for processing cases are becoming
increasingly prominent in cases alleging judicial misconduct. The following
analysis of this caselaw demonstrates that judicial conduct commissions
and reviewing courts have not addressed, head on, the general problem
resulting from the tension between managerial and adjudicatory roles that
such requirements pose for the judge in an overburdened court. Although
the commissions and courts have shown some sympathy for defenses such
as heavy workload and physical or mental disability, they have merely
characterized such circumstances as mitigating factors and failed to ac-
knowledge that the problem may be endemic in their judicial system. Thus,
the cases offer little guidance to judges facing this problem.
The administrative requirement that has most frequently been cited in
state judicial disciplinary proceedings is the command of Canon 3A(5) to
"dispose promptly of the business of the court." 24 This provision takes
aim at the twin evils of neglect and delay and is much more forceful and
directive in addressing these problems than its counterpart provisions in
the old ABA Canons.2 Indeed, the Reporter of the ABA Special Committee
on Standards of Judicial Conduct, the drafters of the Code, explained:
The Committee received reports about judges who procrastinated in deciding
proceedings that were ripe for decision, judges with heavy dockets who
were very irregular in their court appearances, and judges who regularly
caused loss of time to jurors, witnesses, parties, lawyers, and other persons
by lack of punctuality in attending court.26
As indicated below, reported cases alleging violations of Canon 3(A)5 have
reflected these concerns and then some.
24. CODE, supra note 13, at Canon 3A(5).
25. CANONS OF JUDIcIAL ETmcs, Canons 2, 7, 15 & 18 (1924) [hereinafter
CANONS].
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1. Time Standards
In recent years, a number of state legislatures and high courts have
sought to assure prompt case disposition through case processing time
standards.27 Some of these standards require that a judge issue periodic
reports (usually monthly or quarterly) on cases that the judge has had
under advisement for longer than a prescribed period (usually sixty days). 2
Although most jurisdictions do not make the consequences of non-
compliance with the time standards explicit, 29 some states condition payment
of all or a portion of the judge's salary on adherence to the time standards. 0
In other states, instances of noncompliance with the reporting requirements3
or the time standards themselves3 2 automatically results in a report to the
state's judicial conduct commission. The North Dakota rule explicitly states
that the reporting of an "overdue" case to the Judicial Qualifications
Commission "must be treated as a complaint against the judge assigned
to the case." 33
Legislative attempts to condition payment of judicial salaries on ad-
herence to case processing time standards have been successfully challenged
on constitutional grounds in Montana, Nevada, and Wisconsin. 4 In all
three jurisdictions, the state high courts have ruled that such legislative
attempts to require judicial action within a specified time period were
unconstitutional intrusions into judicial branch prerogatives and thus vi-
olative of the doctrine of separation of powers. But, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin in In re Grady,5 announcing its decision to strike down such
27. Such standards are now encouraged at the national level. See, e.g.,
American Bar Association, STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT DELAY REDUCTION
(1984); American Bar Asociation, STANDA.DS RELATING TO APPELLATE DELAY RE-
DUCTION (1988) (prescribed time standards for case disposition in the trial and
appellate courts recommended).
28. See, e.g., ARIz. R. Civ. P. 39(j), 77(1); ARK. CT. R. 146; FLA. JuD.
AiDMun. R. 2.085(e); KAN. Sup. Cr. R. 166; N.Y. UNIroRM JUST. CT. ACT § 1304;
Omo RULEs OF CT. 6; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 16-2-20.1; TEXAS RULES OF
Cr. 297; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-25 & 26; WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 20; Wisc.
Sup. CT. R. 70.36.
29. The mere fact of having to report "overdue" cases (in some jurisdictions
with reasons) evidently is considered to be a sufficient sanction.
30. ARiz. REv. STAT. AN. § 11-424.02; CAL. CONsT. art. 6, § 19; IDAHO
CONST. art. 5, § 17; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 546.27; OR. REv. STAT. § 1.050.
31. S.D. CODEn= LAWS ANN. § 16-2-20.1; Wis. Sup. CT. R. 70.36.
32. N.D. Sup. Cr. ADMN. R. 4(j).
33. Id.
34. Coate v. Omholt, 203 Mont. 488, 662 P.2d 591 (1983); State ex rel.
Watson v. Merialdo, 70 Nev. 322, 268 P.2d 922 (1952); In re Grady, 118 Wis.
2d 762, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984).
35. 118 Wis. 2d at 762, 348 N.W.2d at 559. The rule provides for the
following "remedial measures" for noncompliance: change of assignment; referral
of the matter to the supreme court for initiation of contempt proceedings; and
referral to the judicial conduct commission for investigation of possible misconduct.
WIs. SUP. CT. R. 70.36.
[Vol. 54
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/3
JUDICIAL ROLES
a statute, used the occasion to adopt a rule of judicial administration that
is similar to the offending statute, except that the rule does not include
the withholding of the judge's salary as a possible sanction.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found that the behavior
of the judge who had been charged with violating the statute constituted
misconduct. The court held that the judge's general failure to promptly
perform his duties and to organize his court and supervise his staff so
that the court's business could be promptly dispatched did constitute mis-
conduct under the state's Code of Judicial Ethics, thus warranting a public
reprimand. 6 The court also found that, under the state's code, the judge's
repeatedly filing affidavit forms (pursuant to the unconstitutional statute)
that misrepresented the status of his cases constituted conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice and brought the judicial office into dis-
repute.37
Nowhere in its opinion in Grady did the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
acknowledge that the judge's managerial role might be in conflict with his
adjudicatory role. Although the court found that the judge had "earned
the reputation of being a hardworking fair and honorable judge" and had
had "a heavy workload assignment" during much of the period in question,
it merely characterized these circumstances as "mitigating factors". 38
The filing of erroneous salary affidavits pursuant to similar statutes
in Arizona,39 California, 4° Idaho,41 and Minnesota42 has resulted in the
discipline of judges in a number of cases. 43 In one of these cases, the fact
that the judge apparently did not "knowingly" falsify the salary affidavits
appeared to mitigate, but not entirely excuse, the judge's offense in the
36. In re Grady, 118 Wis. 2d at 785, 348 N.W.2d at 571.
37. Id. See also In re Reeves, 63 N.Y.2d 105, 469 N.E.2d 1321, 480 N.Y.S.2d
463 (1984). In Reeves, the New York Court of Appeals removed a family courtjudge for falsifying pending case reports by directing his clerk to cross off the 60
oldest cases.
38. In re Grady, 118 Wis. 2d at 770-71, 348 N.W.2d at 564.
39. Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-424.02 (1988).
40. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 68210 (West 1976). Unlike the statutes that were
successfully challenged in Montana, Nevada and Wisconsin, the California statute
was enacted pursuant to a constitutional provision, CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 18, which
prohibits receipt of salary by a judge while a cause remains pending and undetermined
for 90 days after submittal for decision.
41. IDAHO CODE § 59-502 (1988). The Idaho statute was also enacted pursuant
to a constitutional provision. See IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § 17.
42. M-N. STAT. ANN. § 546.27 (West 1988).
43. In re Weeks, 658 P.2d 174 (Ariz. 1983); In re McCullough, 43 Cal. 3d
534, 734 P.2d 987, 236 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1987); In re Creede, 42 Cal. 3d 1098, 729
P.2d 79, 233 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1986); Mardikian v. Commission on Judicial Performance,
40 Cal. 3d 473, 709 P.2d 852, 220 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1985); In re Jensen, 24 Cal.
3d 72, 593 P.2d 200, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1978); Inquiry Concerning Judge Anon-
ymous, No. 1975-1 (Idaho Sup. Ct. Jan. 20, 1976); In re Anderson, 312 Minn.
442, 252 N.W.2d 592 (1977).
1989]
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eyes of the Supreme Court of California." In another case, the court
refused to condone a judge's routine practice of issuing resubmission orders
in overdue cases, thus effectively starting the ninety day period over again,
on the grounds that such a practice "would make a mockery of the
constitutional mandate. '4 In none of these cases did the state high courts
acknowledge that such statutes might be in conflict with a judge's adju-
dicatory role and offer guidance as to how these administrative imperatives
might be reconciled with the adjudicatory role.
The falsification of salary affidavits decisions are somewhat unclear as
to whether (or to what extent) the judge would have been sanctioned,
absent the falsification, solely for exceeding officially prescribed time stan-
dards. In time standards cases in states that do not impose a withholding
of salary sanction, such decisions have turned largely on the nature and
frequency of the rule infractions. They have offered no policy guidance
to the overburdened judge who is finding it difficult to comply with the
time standards." In perhaps the most strongly worded decision to date,
In re Carstensen,47 the Supreme Court of Iowa suspended a judge for
thirty days without pay for repeatedly falling to comply with Iowa Supreme
Court Rule 200. The rule required judges to file monthly reports with the
state court administrator on all cases under advisement for over sixty days,
giving reasons for the delay and an expected decision date." If a judge
had no matters pending over sixty days, the rule still required that a report
(stating "none") be filed. 49
Judge Carstensen failed to comply with the rule's reporting requirements
during twenty-eight of the first thirty-seven months of the rule's operation,
by failing to submit five reports and by submitting twenty-three reports
late.10 The state court administrator and the chief justice both had sent
44. In re Creede, 42 Cal. 3d at 1098, 729 P.2d at 200, 233 Cal. Rptr. at
1. Unfortunately, the court did not explain as a matter of either law or policy
why the judge was held accountable even though he did not knowingly falsify the
salary affidavits. Apparently the judge's general failure to monitor his caseload
was enough even though the record revealed the judge to be "diligent, hardworking
and highly respected" and the delays at least "partially attributable to an excessive
workload and inadequate support staff." Id.
45. Mardikian v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 40 Cal. 3d at 485,
709 P.2d at 859, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
46. See, e.g., In re Carstensen, 316 N.W.2d 889 (Iowa 1982); In re Johnson,
355 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1984); In re Reeves, 63 N.Y.2d 105, 469 N.E.2d 1321,
N.Y.S.2d 463 (1984); In re Vincent, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n
(1986); In re Cote, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985); In re Leonard,
Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985); Office of Disciplinary Counsel
v. Capers, 15 Ohio St. 3d 122, 472 N.E.2d 1073 (1984); In re Van Susteren, 118
Wis. 2d 806, 348 N.W.2d 579 (1984).
47. 316 N.W.2d 889 (Iowa 1982).
48. IowA S. Cr. R. 200.
49. Id.
50. In re Carstensen, 316 N.W.2d at 894.
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letters, reminding the judge of his reporting responsibilities. 5' After the
letters apparently did not induce compliance, the chief justice and state
court administrator travelled to Judge Carstensen's court to discuss his
noncompliance with him and his chief judge. 52 Although the report due
immediately following their visit was on time, the reports for each of the
next eleven months were late.53 In addition, eight overdue cases were
completely omitted from the reports and seven cases were reported late.5 4
The Supreme Court of Iowa found that the judge "blatantly, flagrantly,
and persistently disregarded the requirements of rule 200, " constituting
a violation of the Canon 3B(1) requirement to "diligently discharge his
administrative responsibilities. ' 56 Interestingly enough, the court did not
address the question of whether there was a violation of the Canon 3A(5)
prompt disposition requirement in light of the fact that Judge Carstensen
apparently had at least twenty-seven overdue cases pending at various times
during this period. Rather, the court decided the case solely on the grounds
that failure to comply with their rule constituted a 3B(l) violation. The
court explained the rationale for the administrative rule and the need for
compliance: "Rule 200 reports are vital to the efficient administration of
our judicial system, and, as such, they are a necessary duty, which we
expect to be followed and will enforce."5 7 The court explained that the
rule was promulgated because of burgeoning trial court caseloads and that
the rule's reporting system allowed those responsible for case assignments
to provide relief or assistance to judges who have fallen behind.
The Carstensen case stands in contrast to the Supreme Court of New
Jersey's In re Alvino58 decision. In Alvino, the judge had failed to list
"reserved" matters (cases in which all that remains for disposition is the
judge's decision) in weekly reports for eighteen years. Although the Supreme






56. IOWA CODE OF JUDIciAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(1) (same wording as CJC
Canon 3B(1)).
57. In re Carstensen, 316 N.W.2d at 893.
58. 100 N.J. 92, 494 A.2d 1014 (1985). See also Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Capers, 15 Ohio St. 3d 122, 472 N.E.2d 1073 (1984). In Capers, the
Supreme Court of Ohio declined to find that a judge's filing of erroneous docket
reports constituted a violation of the state's- code of judicial conduct. The supreme
court's administrative rule required the filing of quarterly docket status reports
indicating the number of cases pending over 90 days. Although Judge Capers had
failed to report two cases that had been pending for well over 90 days, the court
accepted the board's conclusion that the failure to report was due to confusion
and carelessness and did not constitute a violation of Canon 3A(5). Id. at 124,
472 N.E.2d at 1074.
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and pointed out that the judge knew that he was required to include the
information in his weekly reports, the court dismissed the complaint. 9 The
court found that the judge did not display the requisite degree of wilfulness
to disobey the rules. The judge simply never thought that the reserve matter
reporting requirement was important and no one during the eighteen year
period had brought the omission to his attention. Apparently believing that
it was estopped from complaining at this late date, the court ruled that
it would be unfair under these circumstances to discipline a judge whose
record was otherwise spotless. 60
2. Neglect
In the absence of official case processing time standards or other specific
work-related requirements, alleged violations of the diligence and admin-
istrative requirements of the Code are difficult to assess. Particularly difficult
to evaluate is conduct that reflects an apparent neglect of official duties.
For example, how many days may a judge be inexcusably absent from
office or tardy before the judge may be charged with neglect? Although
such a question suggests an answer in- quantifiable terms (e.g., "y" days
of absence from office constitutes neglect), cases dealing with these matters
generally involve time periods that are so clearly excessive that reviewing
courts have tended to avoid developing a quantitative approach to the issue
of what constitutes neglect.61 While courts sometimes comment on actual
or potential negative consequences of the alleged neglect, they usually leave
the issue of whether a finding of such consequences is a necessary pre-
condition to an ethics violation unclear. Many reviewing courts focus on
the apparent causes of the neglect in determining the extent to which they
will excuse it.
This tendency to focus attention on the apparent cause of the alleged
ethics violation, rather than on the violation itself, is exaggerated where
the cause brings the judge's overall ability to perform the duties of the
judicial office into question. The clearest examples of this tendency are
found in neglect cases where an underlying mental or physical disability
is cited as the reason for the apparent neglect of duties.62 These cases'
59. Id.
60. Alvino, 100 N.J. at 102, 494 A.2d at 1015.
61. See, e.g., Starnes v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 680 S.W.2d
922, 923 (Ky. 1984) ("The fact that a judge is late or absent on occasion does
not warrant a reprimand let alone anything so serious as removal from office. But
the conduct here was chronic and pervasive. It was extreme. It seriously disrupted
the administration of justice . . ."). See also In re Garcia, No. 16,974 (N.M. 1987).
62. In re Sobotka, No. 73651 (Mich. 1985); In re Corning, 538 S.W.2d 46
(Mo. 1976); Stark County Bar Ass'n v. Weber, 175 Ohio St. 13, 190 N.E.2d 918
(1963); In re Clements, Unreported Determination, Pa. Bd. (1975); In re Williamson,
270 S.C. 313, 242 S.E.2d 221 (1978).
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outcomes turn largely on the disciplinary bodies' views of the impairment
and the bodies' willingness to view the neglect as excusable or its cause
as treatable. These cases are analyzed separately below.
On the other hand, where the cause of the repeated absence or tardiness
involves a more clearly voluntary choice on the part of the judge to pursue
nonjudicial activities in lieu of the judge's official duties, reviewing courts
have been more willing to speculate on the negative consequences of the
purported neglect. This has been particularly true in cases, involving outside
activities undertaken for personal gain where such activities were not in
and of themselves illegal or unethical. In In re Troy 6 3 for example, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the judge's tardiness
and absence from court due to his supervision of a marina construction
project in which he had a personal interest violated the Canons of Judicial
EthicsA4 The court condemned the conduct as doing: "a grave disservice
not only to the people and to the judicial system but to the vast majority
of judges who maintain regular court hours and perform as judges should,
not leaving the court house until their judicial business has been properly
disposed of.''65 The court cited evidence of summarily conducted, (or
outright denials of) fair hearings on bail matters and the need to recruit
special judges to perform the judge's work as negative consequences of
the tardiness and absenteeism. 6
Similarly, in In re Gardner,67 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cited
a district justice's failure to insure that arresting officers signed criminal
complaints, his unlawful delegation of judicial authority, and his lack of
supervision of nonjudicial personnel as some of the negative effects of the
justice's failure to devote adequate time to his judicial duties. The judge
was unavailable during his posted hours at the magisterial office for an
average of over 300 hours per year for six consecutive years, due to his
employment as a steel company foreman. The court ruled that the judge's
failure to give his judicial duties priority over his steel company employment
violated provisions of the Rules Governing the Standards of Conduct of
Justices of the Peace. 68 The court found that it was immaterial that the
63. 364 Mass. 15, 306 N.E.2d 203 (1973).
64. CANONS, supra note 25, at Canons 6, 7 & 24. Because the Code had
been adopted in Massachusetts at the time of the decision in In re Troy, but
subsequent to the reported conduct, the court also cited CJC provisions, particularly
Canon 5C(1) ("A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that
tend to reflect adversely on his impartibility, interfere with the proper performance
of his judicial duties . ..").
65. In re Troy, 364 Mass at 68, 306 N.E.2d at 233.
66. Id.
67. Unreported order, 1977.
68. PENNsYLvANuL RULES GOVERNING STANDARDS OF CONDUCT OF JUSTICES
OF THE PEACE, Rule 3-A.
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justice was on call to perform judicial duties during his hours at the steel
company and that he conducted judicial business in the evenings and on
weekends. The court suspended the judge for four months and ordered
that the disciplinary body recommend new sanctions if the judge did not
properly perform his duties following the suspension. 69
Under somewhat similar circumstances, the Supreme Court of Missouri
held that a magistrate had violated the administrative and diligence re-
quirements of Canons 3B(1) and 3B(2) by virtue of his infrequent attendance
in court. In In re Briggs,70 the court found that the judge was regularly
present in court only on Wednesdays and infrequently on other occasions,
resulting in numerous administrative shortcomings, including inadequate
supervision of court staff, improper maintenance of court records, and
unprofessional conduct of court proceedings. Although there was no in-
dication that moonlighting caused the judge's absence, there was some
suggestion that the neglect of judicial duties was tied to "excessive in-
volvement in partisan political activities," which the court found in itself
mandated the judge's removal from office. 71
In cases where reviewing courts are unable to find negative consequences
resulting from a judge's absence from office, courts have been reluctant
to find that the absence in and of itself constitutes misconduct. In a case
where there was "no convincing evidence that harm ever resulted from his
occasional absences" the Supreme Court of Minnesota characterized a
charge that a judge had violated Canon 3B(l) as "purely technical." ' 72 Even
in a case where the absences apparently were much more frequent, the
Supreme Court of Texas ruled that a judge did not neglect his judicial
duties to such a degree as to warrant disciplinary action.73 In the Texas
case, the judge had been absent from court for at least forty-seven days
during a two year period to serve as a paid federal arbitrator.74 In refusing
to find that this constituted an ethics violation, the court cited the favorable
testimony of local attorneys to demonstrate that in terms of the judge's
availability to the bar, industriousness, and ability to keep up with his
69. The supreme court rejected the portion of the recommendation of the
Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board that called for the judge's removal
from office following the suspension unless the judge submitted proof that he had
arranged his steel company employment to give priority to his judicial duties.
Pennsylvania District Justices are now prohibited from holding other jobs. See also
CODE, supra note 13, at Canons 5A and 5B ("distraction from duties" provisions).
70. 595 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. 1980).
71. Id. at 277.
72. In re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1980).
73. In re Brown, 512 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. 1974).
74. The dissent cited the judge's testimony that he received pay (at the rate
of $100 per day) for 206 days during 1969. Id. at 330. At the time, serving as
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docket, apparently no negative consequences resulted from the judge's
absences.
71
3. Dilatoriness and Inefficiency
When a judge delays rendering judgment in a case or cases, the negative
consequences on the administration of justice are more apparent and direct
than they are in the usual neglect scenario. In addition to depriving quick
and certain justice to the litigants in those cases, a judge reinforces the
negative images of the judicial system reflected in such aphorisms as "justice
delayed is justice denied." The Reporter of the Code of Judicial Conduct
stated in his notes to Canon 3A(5): "Failure of a judge to dispose promptly
of the business of the court when there is no justifiable reason for delay
reflects adversely on the entire judicial system." 76 As the caseloads in
American courts have grown, concerns over case delays and concomitant
complaints against the judges presiding over these cases have increased.
Although official case processing time standards of the type reviewed
above have, for good or ill, provided a convenient means for identifying
case delay in many jurisdictions, 77 conduct commissions and reviewing courts
still must answer important questions relating to whether and when case
delays reach the level of sanctionable conduct. To date, courts reviewing
alleged instances of case delay have addressed two general questions: (1)
Does delay in one or two cases constitute sanctionable conduct or must
a pattern of delay be established?; and (2) Does the apparent cause or
reason for the delay either aggravate or excuse the delay? As we shall see,
answers to the second question often influence a court's response to the
first.
Numerous jurisdictions have disciplined judges for the general failure
to dispose promptly of the business of their court as Canon 3A(5) and
similar ethics provisions require .7 Each judge had allowed excessive delays
75. In re Brown, 512 S.W.2d at 322.
76. W. THODE, supra note 26, at 54-55.
77. Although the question of when case delays (in a quantifiable sense) run
afoul of the prompt disposition requirement of Canon 3A(5) is by no means an
easy one in jurisdictions that do not have official case processing time standards,
case processing time standards recently adopted by the American Bar Association
may offer some guidance to judicial disciplinary bodies and reviewing courts in
jurisdictions that have not adopted their own standards. See supra note 27.
78. See In re Weeks, 134 Ariz. 521, 658 P.2d 174 (1983); In re Creede, 42
Cal. 3d 1098, 729 P.2d 79, 233 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1986); Mardikian v. Commission on
Judicial Performance, 40 Cal. 3d 473, 709 P.2d 852, 220 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1985);
In re Jensen, 24 Cal. 3d 72, 593 P.2d 200, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1978); In re
Municipal Court of Cedar Rapids, 188 N.W.2d 354 (Iowa 1971); Starnes v. Judicial
Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 680 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. 1984); In re Heideman, 387
Mich. 630, 198 N.W.2d 291 (1972); In re Anderson, 312 Minn. 442, 252 N.W.2d
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in numerous cases over significant time periods, thus establishing a pattern
of misconduct in failing to adhere to the prompt disposition standard.
Reviewing courts have characterized these patterns of misconduct in broad
terms such as "unreasonable delay, ' 7 9 "habitually dilatory in disposing of
cases," 80 "unnecessary delay in disposition of cases,"'" and "persistent
failure promptly to process, try and dispose of cases."812
The more difficult cases involving the prompt disposition requirement
have been those in which the judge is charged with allowing excessive delay
in only one or two cases. Generally, reviewing courts have excused the
delay absent a showing of aggravating causes or circumstances.83
In cases where the reviewing court disciplines the judge charged with
delay in one or two cases, aggravating circumstances that themselves bor-
dered on misconduct have usually been present that rendered the failure
to adhere to the prompt disposition requirement much more egregious. For
example, courts have sanctioned judges for intentionally delaying the dis-
position of cases in retaliation against attorneys who signed a disciplinary
complaint against the judgen or to benefit a member of the judge's family.8 5
Courts have also disciplined judges where the delay was clearly not an
oversight and thus reflected a higher degree of wilfulness or negligence on
the judge's part. In these delayed cases, the litigants' attorneys had regularly
inquired of the judge concerning case disposition and the judicial disciplinary
592 (1977); In re Steinle, 653 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. 1983); In re Corning, 538 S.W.2d
46 (Mo. 1976); In re Robbins, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985);
In re Cote, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985); In re Leonard,
Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985); In re MacDowell, 393 N.Y.S.2d
748 (1977); In re Van Susteren, 118 Wis. 2d 806, 348 N.W.2d 579 (1984).
79. Weeks, 134 Ariz. at 525, 658 P.2d at 178.
80. Corning, 538 S.W.2d at 51.
81. Starnes, 680 S.W.2d at 923.
82. Heideman, 387 Mich. at 631, 198 N.W.2d at 354.
83. See In re Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 494 A.2d 1014 (1985), where the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, in passing on a judge's failure to handle two cases expe-
ditiously, ruled that "atypical violations of this kind were not intended to, and
do not, constitute judicial misconduct." Id. at 97, 494 A.2d at 1016. In one of
the few reported cases dealing with charges of judicial misconduct in the federal
system, the court adopted an even more "hands off" posture. The Chief Judge
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a complaint
against a federal district court judge for failing to render judgment in timely fashion
in a single matter. In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 593 F.2d 879, 881 (9th
Cir. 1979). The Chief Judge ruled that neither he nor the Judicial Council had
the power to deal with such a situation, "absent any suggestion of corruption or
other impropriety or any indication of a broader pattern of conduct evidencing
incapacity, arbitrariness, or neglect of office." Id. at 881.
84. In re Terry, 262 Ind. 667, 674-75, 323 N.E.2d 192, 196 (1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 867 (1975).
85. In re Tschirhart, 420 Mich. 1201, 362 N.W.2d 235 (1984).
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body had admonished or reprimanded the judge concerning the delay in
the subject case86 or another case.8 7
Perhaps the most celebrated charges of intentional case delay vere
those implicating Chief Justice Rose Bird and other justices of the Supreme
Court of California. The justices initially were charged in a 1978 newspaper
story with having delayed issuance of a controversial ruling until after an
election in which the confirmation of Bird's appointment to the court and
those of three other justices were to have been before the voters. After
a series of widely publicized events-including the Chief Justice's denial
of the charges, her calling for a full investigation by the state's judicial
conduct commission and the decision by an ad hoc Supreme Court that
a rule permitting public (televised) commission hearings was unconstitu-
tional-the commission declined to file formal charges against any justice.8"
Some of the more difficult cases applying the prompt disposition
requirement have been those where the judge intentionally delays disposing
of a case out of a belief that delaying the case will serve the ends of
justice. Reviewing courts generally have not been willing to view the judge's
good intentions in this regard as enough of a mitigating factor to excuse
the delay. 9 Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine suggested that
such apparent good intentions may actually be an aggravating rather than
a mitigating factor. In ruling on charges that a judge had violated the
prompt disposition requirement in two cases, the court found that the
judge had deliberately interfered with the parties "right to prompt dis-
position" and had "determinedly administered his own personal brand of
justice, in plain and direct violation of the standards governing a judge's
performance of his high responsibilities."' 9
86. In re McCullough, 43 Cal. 3d 534, 534, 734 P.2d 987, 987, 236 Cal.
Rptr. 151, 151 (1987).
87. In re Jones, 728 P.2d 311 (Colo. 1986).
88. For a detailed account of this matter, see P. STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES:
Tm INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BID AND =HE CALFoRm~ SurPR.m CoURT (1981).
89. See, e.g., In re Kohn, 568 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. 1978), where a Missourijudge, in responding to a complaint concerning a four year delay in a case, explained
that he delayed the case. to avoid disrupting the relationship between the beneficiary
of a will and her executrix aunt in the hope that the case would settle. Id. at 261.
In censuring the judge for this and other misconduct, the Supreme Court of Missouri
suggested that it might have considered the judge's apparent good intentions in
mitigation of a portion of the delay, but not for the entire four years. Id. See
also Judicial Qualifications Comm'n v. Cieminski, 326 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1982).
In Cieminski, the judge had delayed rendering judgment in numerous small claims
cases apparently to accommodate informal case disposition procedures developed
by the judge. Id. at 888. Although the Supreme Court of North Dakota commented
that the judge's "unorthodox handling of the business of the small claims court
appears to be motivated by a strong sense of morals and a gentle heart," the
court found that the judge's conduct constituted an unexcused violation of Rule
3A(5). Id.
90. In re Barrett, 512 A.2d 1030, 1034 (Me. 1986). In one case, the judge
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More difficult still is the case of the overly conscientious judge whose
abiding concern to do justice in individual cases causes inefficiency in
disposing promptly of the court's business. Although no judicial conduct
case has as yet posed this dilemma in precisely such terms, the Supreme
Court of California faced the issue indirectly in McCartney v. Commission
on Judicial Qualifications.91 In McCartney, a municipal court judge had
been charged with numerous instances of intemperate and injudicious con-
duct in dealing with court personnel, criminal case defendants, and attor-
neys.9 In addition, the judge was charged with "chronic delays" in processing
what generally are considered to be routine or summary matters, particularly
small claims cases. 93 Trials in these cases frequently ran into the evening
and as late as midnight. 94 Although the court noted that the judge's
inefficiency in processing cases appeared "to stem from an effort to attain
a degree of diligence and studiousness in the application of the law which
was unrealistic and frequently unjustified," the court found that "this
pattern of delay stemmed from no dereliction of duty." 95 In declining to
rule on the inefficiency and delay charges as a disciplinary matter, the
court characterized it as a problem more properly handled through local
court administration. In so doing, the court sidestepped the opportunity
to address the tension between the managerial and adjudicatory roles as
a policy matter to be addressed by those at the highest level of the state
judicial bureaucracy.
4. Heavy Workload Defense
The most prominent cases in which state high courts have refused to
deal with the tension between the managerial and adjudicatory roles as a
policy matter are those in which the press of heavy caseloads in understaffed,
high volume courts have been raised as a defense by judges charged with
violating the prompt disposition requirement. While reviewing courts have
shown some sympathy to the pressures heavy workloads and inadequate
staffing arrangements cause, sometimes even suggesting that they might
have considered workload as a mitigating factor even if it was not raised
had delayed ruling for seven years on a petition to dispose of a portion of the
principal of a trust in the belief that in thus preserving the status quo the judge
was fulfilling an obligation he believed he owed the testator to insure that the
trust was administered for the sister-beneficiary's happiness. Id. at 1032. In the
other case, the judge delayed ruling on six different petitions seeking the guardianship
of an infant whose parents were killed in a murder-suicide. Id. at 1033. The judge
explained that he delayed ruling on the petitions in the hope that the paternal and
maternal branches of the infant's family would repair their relationships. Id.
91. 12 Cal. 3d 512, 526 P.2d 268, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1974).
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in the judge's defense, 96 heavy workload has been considered only in
mitigation in the case at hand and not as a general problem to be addressed
as a matter of policy.97
In considering the heavy workload defense in Mardikian v. Commission
on Judicial Performance,98 the Supreme Court of California may have
aggravated the problem as a policy matter. In Mardikian, the judge was
charged with failure to promptly dispose of fourteen cases in one of the
state's highest volume courts whose staffing the supreme court itself char-
acterized as "woefully inadequate." 99 The court pointed out, however, that
eight of the fourteen cases involved matters such as child custody and were
thus particularly deserving of prompt resolution. The judge's apparent
failure to minimize the impact of delay by assigning caseload priorities
based upon the effect of delay on the parties in individual cases rendered
the heavy workload defense much less compelling in the court's eyes. The
court thereby imposed on judges confronted with heavy caseloads the
responsibility for developing a means of ranking cases in priority order to
decide which cases are most deserving of a judge's immediate attention.
Not only was this the first time such a requirement had been enunciated
for California judges, as the dissent noted, 100 but the court failed to provide
trial judges with any guidance as to which cases should be given highest
priority. Rather than clarifying the dictates of the managerial role, the
opinion made it more ambiguous.
5. Disability
In Mardikian and other cases charging judges with neglect or delay,
reviewing courts also considered disabling physical or mental conditions in
96. See, e.g., In re Barrett, 512 A.2d 1030, 1034 (Me. 1986).
97. In re Creede, 42 Cal. 3d 1098, 1099, 729 P.2d 79, 79, 233 Cal. Rptr.
1, 1 (1986); Mardikian v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 40 Cal. 3d 473,
482-83, 709 P.2d 852, 857-58, 220 Cal. Rptr. 833, 839 (1985); In re Jones, 728
P.2d 311, 314 (Colo. 1986); In re Municipal Court of Cedar Rapids, 188 N.W.2d
354, 357-58 (Iowa 1971); In re Kohn, 568 S.W.2d 255, 261 (Mo. 1978); In re
Steinle, 653 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Mo. 1973); In re Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 771, 348
N.W.2d 559, 564 (1984); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Capers, 15 Ohio St.
3d 122, 124, 472 N.E.2d 1073, 1074 (1984).
98. 40 Cal. 3d at 479-81, 709 P.2d at 855-56, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
99. Id. at 479, 709 P.2d at 856, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
100. Justice Kaus, joined by Justice Reynoso, registered a strong dissent in
Mardikian, stating that the judge was "being made the scapegoat for the twin
plagues of judicial overload and backlog." Id. at 485, 709 P.2d at 860, 220 Cal.
Rptr. at 841. He explained:
mrial court judges currently have no rule to consult in determining how
to deal with the problems resulting from an understaffed bench and an
overcrowded docket. Although the adoption of an explicit schedule of
priorities ... may well be a sensible approach, before today's decision
no authority made it clear that the failure to establish such a schedule
would itself be grounds for discipline.
Id. at 487, 709 P.2d at 861, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
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mitigation. Although courts reviewing charges of official judicial misconduct
have been willing to consider the effect of disabling conditions, they have
scrutinized such claims carefully and have required clear evidence of the
disability's existence. 10'
Where the evidence clearly establishes the disabling condition and the
condition appears to be an underlying cause of the neglect or delay,
disciplinary bodies have taken widely varying approaches to considering
the appropriateness of disciplinary measures. Although most have imposed
sanctions short of removal from office if the condition is considered treatable
(e.g., alcoholism) and the judge indicates a willingness and ability to be
permanently rehabilitated,'02 others have removed the judge without con-
sidering treatment. 03 This is particularly true where the disciplinary body
has viewed the condition as voluntary,'04 or where the judge was capable
of conforming to the prompt disposition requirement when under pressure
to do so.105 On the other hand, such disciplinary bodies have removed or
retired judges where the disabling conditions seriously interfere with the
performance of their judicial duties."06
Thus, even where a disabling condition is clearly involuntary, the
tendency is to hold the judge to the same performance standards as judges
who are not disabled.? 7 Although some disciplinary bodies may offer judges
101. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 312 Minn. 442, 445-46, 252 N.W.2d 592, 593
(1977) (the judge's contention that he was suffering from "a mental sickness of
a nature which has impaired his judicial effectiveness" was unsupported by the
evidence where the disability claim was based solely on the judge's testimony).
102. See, e.g., Mardikian v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 40 Cal.
3d 473, 709 P.2d 852, 220 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1985); In re Sobotka, No. 73651 (Mich.
1985); Stark County Bar Ass'n v. Weber, 175 Ohio St. 13, 190 N.E.2d 918 (1963).
In Sobotka, the judge's performance was supervised by the commission for six
months following her apparently successful treatment for alcoholism. In Weber,
the judge was given a reprimand after similarly completing a one year probationary
period following a finding of alcohol abstention. 175 Ohio St. at 15-16, 190 N.E.2d
at 919.
103. Starnes v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 680 S.W.2d 922
(Ky. 1984); In re Clements, Unreported Determination, Pa. Bd. (1975).
104. See Starnes, 680 S.W.2d at 923 (the judge's drug addiction was "a result
of voluntary conduct" and did "not afford a valid defense to charges of mis-
conduct").
105. See In re Coming, 538 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. 1976), where the Supreme Court
of Missouri removed a judge from office who was suffering from an "[o]bsessive
[c]ompulsive [n]eurosis" that allegedly accounted for his difficulty in reaching
decisions. Id. at 52. The court noted that when the judge's dilatoriness had resulted
in earlier warnings by the commission, he was able to clear up his backlog of
cases. Id. Thus, the court refused to consider allowing the judge to resume his
duties while under treatment for the mental infirmity. Id.
106. See, e.g., In re Williamson, 270 S.C. 313, 320, 242 S.E.2d 221, 224
(1978).
107. See, e.g., Mardikian v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 40 Cal.
3d 473, 485, 709 P.2d 852, 859-60, 220 Cal. Rptr. 833, 841 (1985), where the
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opportunities to correct the condition, in the first instance the judge has
the "obligation to seek relief, even to the extent of withdrawing temporarily
or permanently from the functions of his office if the circumstances require
it.,,I0s
6. Management System
The Canon 3A(5) prompt disposition standard together with the ad-
ministrative diligence standard of Canon 3B(1) establish a general duty to
create and maintain an adequate case management system. This duty will
vary depending upon the case scheduling system a judge's court employs.
The judge in a court with an individual calendar, for example, should
have greater case management responsibilities than one in a court with a
master calendar.' °9
Complaints against judges for allegedly violating their case management
responsibilities generally have been incidental to case neglect or delay
charges, with the case management failures viewed as an underlying cause
of the neglect or delay. Thus, judges charged with prompt disposition
violations have also been charged with the failure to maintain complete
case dockets," 0 to establish a tracking system for individual cases,' and
to set case scheduling priorities." 2
Arguably, a judge's strictness in docketing or scheduling cases could
create as many dysfunctions as laxity in case management. An inflexible
policy of refusing to grant continuances or adjournments once a case has
been set for trial could unnecessarily disadvantage a party with a legitimate
need for additional time to prepare his or her case. However, a New York
appellate court has ruled that a judge's rigid adherence to his court's strict
continuance policy did not constitute misconduct."'
court stated that a judge's conduct "must be evaluated on the basis of objective
criteria applicable to all judges similarly situated within the system." Id.
108. Id. at 485, 709 P.2d at 859-60, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41.
109. For a description and analysis of calendaring systems and the case
management responsibilities of trial judges, see M. SOLOMON & D. SOMERLOT,
CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT IN THE TIAL COURT (1987).
110. In re Vincent, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1986); In re
Robbins, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985); In re Jutkofsky, Unre-
ported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985).
111. In re Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984). The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin apparently considered as a mitigating factor the judge's es-
tablishment of a case tracking system after the filing of the disciplinary complaint.
112. Mardikian v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 40 Cal. 3d 473, 709
P.2d 852, 220 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1985).
113. In re Mertens, 56 A.D.2d 456, 392 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1977).
1989]
21
Alfini: Alfini: Doing Justice in a Bureaucracy
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
7. Assignment
Although a court using a master calendar burdens a judge less with
case management responsibilities, the chief administrative judge in such a
court has greater case assignment burdens than his or her counterpart in
a court with an individual calendar system. Unnecessary delays in assigning
cases to individual judges in a master calendar court can result in case
backlogs with system-wide effects. Such behavior would also run counter
to the Canon 3B(1) command to "facilitate the performance of the ad-
ministrative responsibilities of other judges and court officials. '"" 4
Because administrative shortcomings of chief judges generally are con-
sidered better handled through corrective action within the judicial bu-
reaucracy rather than through the disciplinary process, conduct commissions
and reviewing courts have taken a cautious approach in such cases. In
McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, for example, the
Supreme Court of California declined to discipline a master calendar judge
who "habitually ran far behind the normal time schedule in assigning
cases." " 5 Even though the court found that the judge's slowness in assigning
cases increased case backlogs throughout the judicial district, there was no
evidence of dereliction of duty on the judge's part. On the contrary, the
court found that a strong commitment to fairness and innovative procedural
reform caused the judge's behavior. It applauded the judge's motivations,
leaving correction of the administrative dysfunctions which the judge's
behavior caused to local court administration rather than dealing with it
as a policy matter at the highest level of the state judicial bureaucracy." 6
B. The Judge as Personnel Manager and Judicial Subordinate
In addition to the role of case manager, most judges must also assume
the role of personnel manager. Although the ethical and administrative
imperatives governing the personnel management role are more straight-
forward than those governing the case management role, cases charging
judges with misconduct in pursuing this role raise some unresolved policy
issues.
Canon 3B(2) imposes on a judge the duty to require of the judge's
"staff and court officials subject to his direction and control" the same
standard of administrative diligence that applies to the judge.17 A corollary
114. CODE, supra note 13, at Canon 3B(1).
115. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512,
536, 526 P.2d 268, 285, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 277 (1974) (en banc).
116. "This careful and dedicated approach to even the most minor traffic
cases was an admirable contrast to the 'assembly-line justice' dispensed by some
trial courts which is now drawing increasing public criticism." Id. at 546, 526 P.2d
at 287-88, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 279-80 (citation omitted).
117. CODE, supra note 13, at Canon 3B(2).
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to the judge's duty to require a high standard of performance of the
judge's staff is that the judge will be held accountable for the administrative
shortcomings of that staff. Disciplinary cases holding judges accountable
for staff deficiencies may generally be grouped into four categories: (1)
misuse of staff; (2) improper delegation of judicial responsibilities to staff;
(3) undersupervision of staff; and (4) oversupervision of staff.
Disciplinary bodies and reviewing courts have tended to be most harsh
with judges who misused their staff. In some of these cases the judges
directed their staff to perform non-court-related functions. Thus, judges
have been disciplined for directing staff members to neglect their judicial
system duties to work on projects that accrued to the judge's financial
benefit"' or political benefit.11 9
A judge may also misuse his or her staff by directing them to perform
their court-related duties in an improper manner. For example, judges have
been disciplined for instructing staff to perform their administrative func-
tions in ways that would favor 20 or disfavor 2' particular parties in cases
before the court.
Judges have also been disciplined under Canon 3B(1) and 3B(2) for
delegating judicial responsibilities to unauthorized court personnel. These
unauthorized delegations of authority have included allowing court staff
to sign the judge's name to warrants,'1 perform marriages, 23 reduce traffic
tickets,'24 set bonds,125 grant continuances,' 26 and grant limited driving
privileges. 27
118. In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 306 N.E.2d 203 (1973). In Troy, a court
officer who was qualified to operate heavy construction equipment operated a
bulldozer during court hours on a marina project in which the judge had a financial
interest. Id. at 63-64, 306 N.E.2d at 230.
119. In re Briggs, 595 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. 1980). In Briggs, the judge allegedly
had court employees work on political matters during court hours, including the
typing of political letters and making political phone calls. Id. at 271.
120. In re Pomante, Unreported Determination, Pa. Bd. (1978). In Pomante,
the judge had instructed his staff to withhold blue copies of traffic citations to
prevent the assessment of points against certain defendants. The judge had also
instructed his staff to notify only the police officer of the hearing in certain speed
check violation cases where a minimum of two witnessing police officers was
required.
121. Troy, 364 Mass. at 15, 306 N.E.2d at 203. In Troy, the judge allegedly
instructed probation office staff to automatically have criminal complaints issued
in nonsupport cases involving public assistance complainants (contrary to the usual
practice of the probation office).
122. In re Elder, Unreported Determination, N.M. Comm'n (1972).
123. In re Perea, 103 N.M. 617, 617, 711 P.2d 894, 894 (1986).
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Disciplinary bodies have also found Canon 3B(2) violations in cases
charging judges with undersupervision of court staff. For example, courts
have disciplined judges for failing to instruct court personnel on admin-
istrative procedures for ensuring that probate matters did not become
delinquent' 21 and for failing to instruct court staff on proper recordkeeping
and financial accounting procedures. 2 9
In a recent case, the supervision requirement was carried to an extreme.
The Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly admonished a justice
of the Supreme Court of Texas because of the alleged unethical conduct
of the judge's staff.30 Two of the justice's briefing attorneys had accepted
a free weekend trip to Las Vegas from a member of a law firm that had
cases pending before the court. The justice explained that he did not know
of the trip beforehand. However, the Commission found that the justice's
general failure to instruct his staff that they were required to observe the
same standards of fidelity and diligence that applied to him constituted a
violation of Canon 3B(2).111 Must one logically conclude from this case
that the prudent Texas judge must henceforth supply his or her staff with
copies of the Code of Judicial Conduct and explain its application to
them? The decision offers no guidance on this matter.
Disciplinary bodies have been more reluctant to find ethics violations
where a judge is charged with oversupervision of court staff. In In re
Kohn,'1 for example, the judge allegedly kept his court staff on a very
tight rein in refusing to allow them sufficient discretion to deal with minor
deviations and technical violations of an elaborate set of procedural rules
which the judge established.' 33 Although the Supreme Court of Missouri
characterized this conduct as administratively deficient, the court refused
to find that the judge's oversupervision constituted misconduct. However,
in strongly suggesting that the judge correct these "deficiencies,"' 34 the
128. In re Van Susteren, 118 Wis. 2d 806, 810, 348 N.W.2d 579, 580 (1984).
129. See, e.g., In re Jutkofsky, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n
(1985).
130. The Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct may issue public reprimands
and admonitions without a formal hearing and the sanctions are not appealable.
For an account of the general controversy surrounding this matter, see Shaman,
Texas Supreme Court Justices Publicly Reprimanded, Admonished, 9 JuD. CONDUCT
REP. 1 (1987).
131. Id. at 9.
132. 568 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
133. Id. at 258.
134. In Kohn, the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
[We cannot find that respondent's elaborate system of rules nor his staff's
often unyielding and sometimes arrogant application of those rules merit
a finding of misconduct. It nevertheless behooves respondent, who is now
fully apprised of such complaints, to correct these deficiencies and be as
zealous in fostering a spirit of courteous staff cooperation with the Bar
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court indicated disapproval of the judge's personnel practices but failed to
offer any guidance, as a policy matter, as to the proper limits of judicial
supervision of court staff.
In addition to personnel resources, a judge has equipment and facilities
at his or her command. Among a judge's administrative responsibilities is
the duty to insure that these resources are utilized primarily in connection
with the judge's judicial responsibilities and secondarily in connection with
peripheral matters related to the judicial function.'35 A judge runs afoul
of this duty if the judge misuses these resources.
A judge may not use such public resources for personal financial gain 3 6
or political purposes. 37 Even if the judge is ostensibly using judicial staff
and facilities for public purposes, those purposes should be related in some
way to the functions of the judicial office.'
Just as judges are responsible for properly supervising and directing
their staff, they are responsible for complying with the administrative
directives of others within the judicial bureaucracy. As discussed in part
I, the judicial articles of state constitutions generally establish an admin-
istrative hierarchy within the states' judicial systems which vests overall
superintending authority in the state's highest appellate court, permits the
high court to exercise its administrative authority through a state court
administrator, and provides for a system of chief judicial officers within
each geographical judicial district.'3 9 Judges have been charged with ethics
violations and disciplined for refusing to comply with the directives of
those in superior administrative positions within the judicial hierarchy.
Judges are required to comply with both general administrative rules
and practices which the state high court establish and with particular
directives and requests of its administrative officials. Thus, a judge may
not refuse to comply with an administrative rule promulgated pursuant to
135. E.g., involvement in professional activities that would enhance the judge's
performance or maintain his or her competence in judicial administration. See
CODE, supra note 13, at Canon 3B(l).
136. See, e.g., In re Gardner, Unreported Determination, Pa. Bd. (1977),
where a justice of the peace advertised a tax return preparation business in the
yellow pages of the telephone directory, giving as its address and telephone number
that of his judicial office, and that he allowed certain aspects of the business to
be conducted at his judicial office.
137. In re Briggs, 595 S.W.2d 270, 276-77 (Mo. 1980); In re Conda, 72 N.J.
229, 235, 370 A.2d 16, 19-20 (1977).
138. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 357 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1978)
(judge used judicial staff and facilities to investigate certain local officials).
139. Explicit constitutional grants of superintending authority are of relatively
recent vintage and are generally considered to have resulted from the modern
movement towards "court unification." See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying
text.
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the high court's rulemaking authority. 40 A judge must also comply with the
directives and requests of administrative officials to whom the high court has
constitutionally delegated administrative responsibilities.' 4
At the local level, judges must comply with the administrative rules,
practices and directives of the chief judicial official of the geographical district
in which the judge sits. A judge's refusal to obey legitimate orders of local
judicial officials may be grounds for charging the judge with an ethics
violation. 142
C. The Judge as Fiscal and Records Manager
A judge's Canon 3B(1) duty to "diligently discharge his administrative
responsibilities"' 143 extends to the handling of court monies (acquired through
the assessment of fees, fines, and other costs). Statutes and administrative
regulations normally set forth financial recordkeeping and remittance require-
ments for these funds, thus establishing basic standards for determining
whether the Canon 3B(1) administrative diligence requirement has been vi-
olated. Courts have disciplined judges for violating such standards in failing
to deposit funds in court accounts in timely fashion, 144 failing to remit funds
140. In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975). In Kading, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the validity of a Judicial Code of Ethics rule
requiring each state judge to file an annual financial disclosure statement. Id. at
533-34, 235 N.W.2d at 421.
141. Fisher v. Thompson, Unreported Determination, Delaware Court on the
Judiciary (1974); In re Anderson, 312 Minn. 442, 252 N.W.2d 592 (1977). In
Fisher, a justice of the peace was disciplined for refusing to perform judicial services
under a work schedule established by a deputy state court administrator; and in
Anderson, the judge was disciplined for failing to comply with informational requests
of Minnesota's state court administrator.
142. In re Dennis, Unreported Determination, Pa. Bd. (1976); In re Getty,
Unreported Determination, Pa. Bd. (1972). In Dennis, a judge was charged with
an ethics violation by the Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board for
failing to comply with a standing local practice of seeking the permission of the
chief judicial officer of the judge's county if the judge expected to be absent from
the judicial office. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rendered the case moot
because the judge's term of office had expired by the time the case came before
the court. In Getty, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania removed a justice of the
peace for refusing to comply with an order of his chief judge temporarily assigning
the judge to another magisterial district.
143. CODE, supra note 13, at Canon 3B(1).
144. Bartlett v. Flynn, 50 A.D.2d 401, 378 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1976); In re Rater,
Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1986); In re Sandburg, Unreported
Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985); In re Cote, Unreported Determination, N.Y.
Comm'n (1985); In re Robbins, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985).
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to state comptrollers or similar officials within prescribed time periods, 45 and
failing to adequately maintain or reconcile official accounts.
146
As guardians of these public funds, judges are also held to standards
similar to others who act in a fiduciary capacity. Thus, judges may not
commingle court funds with other public funds147 or with personal funds. 48
Nor may judges act in violation of applicable laws149 or engage in self-
dealing by, for example, switching court funds from one bank to another
for personal reasons5 °.
Judges also have a general duty to collect and deposit in court accounts
all court fees, fines and costs. They have been disciplined where their
handling of the funds gives the appearance that the funds have been diverted
or converted to the judge's personal use.' Judges have also been disciplined
where their failure to collect and deposit required fines and costs suggests
that they favored certain parties. 52 General negligence in the handling of
court funds also has prompted reviewing courts to discipline judges.'53
Because high volume, lower criminal courts generate most court revenues
(e.g., fines and costs in traffic cases), many judges charged with mishandling
court funds have been nonlawyers who have sought to use their nonlawyer
status to excuse their conduct on the grounds that they were ignorant of,
or not fully competent in, the law. But disciplinary bodies have been
unsympathetic to defenses such as ignorance or incompetence.1 54 On the
145. In re Serrano, No. 10968 (Sup. Ct. of N.M. 1976); Rogers v. State
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 51 N.Y.2d 224, 414 N.E.2d 382 (1980); Bartlett v.
Flynn, 50 A.D.2d 401, 378 N.Y.S. 145 (1976); In re Vincent, Unreported Deter-
mination, N.Y. Comm'n (1986); In re Rater, Unreported Determination, N.Y.
Comm'n (1986); In re Jutkofsky, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985);
In re Sandburg, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985); In re Cote,
Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985); In re Gardner, Unreported De-
termination, Pa. Bd. (1977).
146. In re Vincent, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1886); In re
Jutkofsky, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985); Judicial Qualifications
Comm'n v. Cieminski, 326 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1982).
147. Bartlett, 50 A.D.2d at 401, 378 N.Y.S. at 145.
148. Lavan v. State Bar of Michigan, 384 Mich. 624, 186 N.W.2d 331 (1971).
149. In re Conda, 72 N.J. 229, 370 A.2d 16 (1977).
150. In re Tschirhart, 420 Mich. 1201, 362 N.W.2d 235 (1984).
151. Lavan, 384 Mich. at 624, 186 N.W.2d at 331; In re Garner, 466 So.
2d 884 (Miss. 1985); In re Serrano, No. 10968 (N.M. 1976); In re Montaneli,
Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1986); In re Sandburg, Unreported
Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985).
152. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978); In re Gardner,
Unreported Determination, Pa. Bd. (1977).
153. In re Clements, Unreported Determination, Pa. Bd. (1975).
154. See, e.g., In re Garner, 466 So. 2d at 884, where the Supreme Court
of Mississippi removed from office a nonlawyer justice of the peace who had
received and failed to report at least 59 fines totaling $3,626.00. In Garner, the
judge, a high school graduate with two years of college, apparently had established
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other hand, conduct commissions and reviewing courts have been willing
to consider in mitigation a judge's apparent good faith in cooperating with
the disciplinary body and attempting to rectify the judge's shortcomings.'5 5
In addition to being held to high standards in the maintenance of their
courts' financial records, judges are also expected to maintain adequate
records of the cases that come before their courts. They may not fail to
maintain case files or dockets, 15 6 particularly where such conduct tends to
favor certain litigants. 15 7 Similarly, judges may not favor or disfavor certain
parties by maintaining secret files,"' or by altering'59 or destroying' 6° certain
court records. They must also keep court records in a secure place.' 6'
For some cases, such as those involving traffic violations, statutes or
regulations may require the judge to report or transmit these cases to other
state agencies. Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action. 162
D. Roles Dictated by Other Bureaucratic Imperatives
A judge's critical position in the judicial bureaucracy requires the judge
to insure that the integrity of the judicial system is preserved and maintained.
a "general fund" with unreported money to cover bad checks from law violators
in other cases. She argued that her conduct was not wilful but neglectful, arising
from ignorance and incompetence. The court responded: "Official integrity of our
Justice Court Judges is vitally important, for it is on that level that many citizens
have their only experience with the judiciary. We may not tolerate misconduct or
misfeasance on any ground, particularly not on grounds of ignorance or incom-
petence." Id. at 887.
155. See, e.g., In re Sandburg, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n(1985), where the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct chose to censure
rather than remove a nonlawyer, town justice under circumstances that the com-
mission indicated would normally warrant removal. In Sandburg, the judge had
failed to deposit funds totalling over $800 in his official court account and had
permitted his wife (who served as court clerk) to cash personal checks from
undeposited court funds. When the judge was notified of an audit, he deposited
a surplus of funds, including personal funds, in the court account to clear up the
deficiency and subsequently cooperated with the Commission investigation.
156. In re Cote, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985); In re
Robbins, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985); In re Clements, Unre-
ported Determination, Pa. Bd. (1975).
157. See, e.g., In re Odom, 444 So. 2d 835 (Miss. 1984), where a Mississippijustice of the peace failed to maintain docket entries or records in bad check cases,
thus effectively operating a check collection service for local merchants. The court
considered the fact that the judge cooperated in the commission's investigation and
admitted his mistakes in mitigation and reprimanded the judge.
158. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978). In Peoples, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina removed a judge for maintaining "special files"
for certain parties, thus effectively removing the disposition of cases from public
view in open court by transacting the court's business in secrecy. Id. at 917.
159. In re Sterlinske, 123 Wis. 2d 245, 365 N.W.2d 876 (1985).
160. In re Pomante, Unreported Determination, Pa. Bd. (1978).
161. In re Elder, Unreported Determination, N.M. Comm'n (1972).
162. In re Johnson, 355 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1984); In re Cote, Unreported
Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985).
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Among the administrative responsibilities which impose Canon 3B on a
judge, therefore, is that of taking or initiating "appropriate disciplinary
measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which
the judge may become aware.' 1 63 Thus, a judge exposes himself or herself
to disciplinary action for failure to report the misconduct of other judges164
or attorneys 65 to attorney disciplinary bodies and judicial conduct com-
missions.
Judicial conduct commissions are adjuncts of the modern judicial bu-
reaucracy. Judges are required to comply with these bodies' directives and
to cooperate fully with them in matters involving the legitimate exercise
of their disciplinary functions. Judges may not, therefore, refuse to answer
a commission subpoena,'6 make false statements to a commission,167 or a
commission member, 161 or otherwise seek to deceive a commission. 69 Nor
may a judge interfere with commission investigations or proceedings through
threats or acts of retaliation against attorneys70 or others171 who complained
of the judge's conduct. 172
The last of Canon 3B's enumerated "administrative responsibilities"
deals with judicial powers of appointment. It requires that a judge "not
make unnecessary appointments;" calls upon the judge to "exercise his
power of appointment only on the basis of merit, avoiding nepotism and
favoritism;" and mandates that a judge "not approve compensation of
appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered.'1 7 Although judges'
163. CODE, supra note 13, at Canon 3B(3).
164. See, e.g., In re Gassman, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n
(1986), where the New York Commission admonished a judge for failure to report
an alleged attempt by another judge to engage him in an ex parte communication
that was clearly intended to influence the judge's decision as to bail in a particular
case.
165. See, e.g., In re Laurie, No. 84 CC5 (Ill. Cts. Comm'n, 1985), where
a judge was suspended for failing to report proffered gifts by attorneys.
166. In re Proceedings Before Comm'n on Judicial Tenure & Discipline, 499
A.2d 751 (R.I. 1985).
167. Temporary State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct v. Perry, 53 A.D.2d 882,
385 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1976).
168. In re Leon, 440 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1983).
169. See, e.g., In re Myers, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1986),
where a judge charged with having a personal interest in a case attempted to make
it appear that he had intended to disqualify himself by producing a note to this
effect to a fellow judge. However, neither the note nor the papers in the case
were ever transmitted to the other judge.
170. In re Lopez-Alexander, Unreported Order, Mayor of Denver (Colo. 1985);
In re Terry, 262 Ind. 667, 323 N.E.2d 192, cert. denied sub nom. Terry v. Indiana
Supreme Court Disciplinary Comm'n, 423 U.S. 867 (1975).
171. In re Scott, Unreported Determination, Texas Comm'n (1985); In re
Buchanan, No. J.D. (Wash. 1983).
172. In re Myers, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1986); In re
Hill, Unreported Determination, N.Y. Comm'n (1985).
173. CODE, supra note 13, at Canon 3B(4).
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appointive powers vary considerably across jurisdictions, these powers gen-
erally include the power to make temporary appointments in individual
cases (trustees, receivers, administrators, guardians, attorneys for indigent
criminal defendants, etc.) as well as permanent appointments to staff
positions in the judge's court. Constitutional or statutory provisions, or
court rules, establish the nature and scope of these appointive powers,
constrained in their exercise by judicial ethics rules (Canon 3B(4) or its
equivalent).
The prohibition of unnecessary appointments is largely directed toward
the judge who is tempted to exercise the appointive power to benefit others.
It thus overlaps the favoritism prohibition. In Spruancev.Commissionon
JudicialQualifications,174 for example, the judge had appointed two lawyer
friends and political supporters to represent indigent criminal defendants
even though a public defender would normally have been assigned to the
cases. The Supreme Court of California found that the judge violated
Canon 3B(4) in that he exceeded his authority in failing to follow statutory
requirements in determining indigency and in failing to determine whether
a public defender was available and able to represent the defendants.
A judge also violates Canon 3B(4) if the judge's appointments suggest
favoritism. In In re Bonin, 15 the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of
Massachusetts was held to have demonstrated favoritism in appointing
certain secretaries in his office. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
ruled that the judge, in making the appointments, "created the impression
that employment opportunities in the judicial branch of government were
greater for persons and relatives of persons who had made gifts to, or
done favors for, the appointing authority. 1' 76
While reviewing courts have tended to be strict in addressing violations
of explicit provisions of Canon 3B(4), they have been more lenient where
apparent violations involved matters of interpretation. The nepotism pro-
hibition, for example, is straightforward. A judge may not exercise ap-
pointment powers in favor of relatives.1 77 On the other hand, an error in
174. 13 Cal. 3d 778, 532 P.2d 1209, 119 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1975).
175. 375 Mass. 680, 378 N.E.2d 669 (1978). See also In re Lawrence, 417
Mich. 248, 335 N.W.2d 456 (1983), where the judge appointed attorneys with whom
he was formerly associated and had financial ties to represent indigent criminal
defendants. Although the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the judge had
violated various ethics provisions (specifically Canons 2, 3C, and 5C(l)), the court
failed to specify a violation of Canon 3B(4).
176. In re Bonin, 375 Mass. at 680, 378 N.E.2d at 677.
177. See In re Jenkins, 244 Or. 554, 419 P.2d 618 (1966), where the judge
appointed his wife as the administratrix of four different estates. See also In re
Littell, 294 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 1973), where the judge appointed himself and
his wife as agents of the state for the purpose of returning prisoners to the court
from other jurisdictions. In Littell, however, the Supreme Court of Indiana, although
disapproving of the judge's conduct, held that the judge was not guilty because
the applicable canons of judicial ethics were not yet in effect in Indiana at the
time of the violation.
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interpreting the requirements for making an appointment might be forgiven.
In In re Ryman,7 8 for example, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that
it was not appropriate to discipline a judge who had permitted a deputy
clerk to act as a magistrate without lawful authority. The court noted that
the judge had "apparently failed to read the statute carefully and erred
in his interpretation of the requirements for making the appointment" and
that it was therefore "not appropriate to discipline a judge for inadvertent,
isolated error. 1 79
III. JUDiciAL ROLES AN4D PATroLoGins
This review of the caselaw enforcing administrative imperatives on state
judges demonstrates the importance that state judicial bureaucracies accord
to managerial and administrative roles. The increased prominence accorded
to non-adjudicatory roles raises potential problems for state court judges.
One potential problem is role overload. Has the modem judge been asked
to assume so many roles-adjudicator, case manager, personnel manager,
recordkeeper, financial manager, etc.-that the importance of the adju-
dicatory role will be downgraded? The ethics decisions suggest that such
a problem is most likely to occur in limited jurisdiction courts and unlikely
to occur in general jurisdiction trial courts and appellate courts where only
the case management role appears to be in active competition with the
adjudicatory role for the judge's attention.
Because the prominence now accorded to the case management role
may bring it into direct conflict with the adjudicatory role, the remainder
of this article is devoted primarily to an analysis of the interplay between
these two roles. As we have seen, the dictates of these roles are not always
clear and unambiguous. If the dictates of one of these roles come into
conflict with the imperatives of the other, how should the judge resolve
the dilemma? Role theory provides a helpful context in which to address
such questions.
Role theory, as social scientists have developed it, is a very useful
device for analyzing operating realities in modern organizations. 11o The role
concept refers to expectations as to how a person holding a particular
position in the organization should behave. Both the person in the position
and those with whom he or she interacts, referred to as members of the
person's "role-set," hold such expectations. Thus viewed, role theory has
178. 394 Mich. 637, 232 N.W.2d 178 (1975).
179. Id. at 651, 232 N.W.2d at 183.
180. This discussion of organizational roles is drawn primarily from C. HANDY,
UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONS (1985) and D. KATZ & R. KAHN, THE SocIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS (1978).
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been shown to be particularly useful for identifying and analyzing dys-
functions and pathologies in complex organizations.'
If, as Fiss contends, we should view today's courts as large scale,
highly complex organizations, role theory should have direct application
to our analysis of judicial bureaucratization.8 2 As a central figure in the
judicial system, the judge interacts with many people who have varying
expectations about the judge's behavior. For purposes of the bureaucra-
tization analysis, members of the judge's role set may be divided into the
following categories: (1) attorneys and litigants in cases before the judge;
(2) other judges and non-judicial personnel in the judge's court; (3) chief
judges and court administrators in the state judicial system hierarchy; and
(4) government officials outside the judicial system.
Lawyers and litigants who bring cases before the judge see the judge
primarily in his or her adjudicatory role. They expect the judge to render
justice in their case through the thoughtful, impartial application of legal
precedent. Thus, their expectations are that the judge will behave in ways
that are consistent with traditional notions of the judge as case-decider or
adjudicator. If the judge fails to live up to one or more parties' expectations
in a particular case, the party may appeal and place the judge at risk of
reversal on appeal.
The judges' judicial colleagues and the non-judicial staff of the judge's
court, on the other hand, view the judge primarily in his or her managerial
role. Although they may develop, secondhand, a sense of the judge's
reputation as an adjudicator, they are less concerned with the judge's
adjudicative ability than they are with the judge's managerial efficiency.
They expect the judge to handle his or her share of the local judicial
workload. Because the judge's ability to live up to their managerial ex-
pectations will influence their own case assignments and workloads, a sense
of competition in efficient case processing may develop among the judges.
Current caseflow management standards and commentaries encourage such
a sense of competition or peer pressure, insofar as they call for active
judicial control of the litigation process and associated statistical monitoring
systems that permit case disposition rate comparisons among judges."' A
judge's failure to live up to local standards of managerial efficiency may
result not only in the judge's peers viewing the judge in a less favorable
light but also local court administrative sanctions through such measures
181. Rizzo, House & Lirtzman, Role Conflict and Ambiguity in Complex
Organizations, 15 ADMiN. Sci. Q. 150 (1970) [hereinafter Rizzo].
182. For an extensive discussion of the application of role theory to the state
courts, see H. GLICK & K. ViNs, STATE COURT SYsTEMs 52-69 (1973). A more
focussed discussion of role theory to analyze the roles of court administrators can
be found in Stott, The Judicial Executive: Toward Greater Congruence in an
Emerging Profession, 7 Jus. Sys. J. 152 (1982).
183. See, e.g., STANDARDs RELATINo TO CouRT DELAY REDUCTION, supra note
28; M. SOLOMON & D. SOMERLOT, supra note 109.
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as being given less than desirable judicial assignments or even withholding
the assignment of additional cases until the judge clears up his or her case
backlog.184
Similarly, chief judges, court administrators and others occupying po-
sitions of administrative authority in the state judicial hierarchy tend to
emphasize the judge's managerial role. Time standards, associated case
reporting requirements, and other administrative imperatives establish def-
inite expectations concerning a judge's managerial efficiency. Failure to
live up to these expectations can result not only in the judge being compared
unfavorably with his colleagues, but also with the judge being charged
with ethics violations and even in the withholding of the judge's salary in
a few jurisdictions.1 8 5
Finally, government officials outside the judicial branch view judges
in some courts as managers of records or fiscal matters. Generally, these
are judges in rural-area lower courts that generate considerable revenues
in fees and fines, particularly in traffic cases. Failure to handle and properly
transmit these funds to certain government officials or to keep and transmit
traffic records to others may lead to charges of having violated certain
ethical norms.
The present emphasis given to these multiple judicial roles may lead
to certain pathologies or dysfunctions. Among the role problems and
pathologies that social scientists have identified in other organizational
contexts are role ambiguity, role conflict, and role strain.1' 6
Because the emphasis on judicial managerial and administrative roles
is relatively new, a judge's conception of these roles and associated ex-
pectations among members of a judge's role set may be unclear. Thus,
there may be a degree of role ambiguity. Some of the cases discussed in
this Article reflect such ambiguities. In Mardikian v. Commission on Judicial
Performance,I87 for example, the Supreme Court of California stated that
a judge in a court with a heavy workload is expected to arrange cases in
priority order in fulfilling her managerial role.'88 However, as the dissenting
justices pointed out, such a requirement had not been authoritatively im-
posed nor made a grounds for discipline before the Supreme Court's ruling
184. Such a "sanction" has even been formalized in at least one federal
appellate court. The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has an
internal rule (passed on April 7, 1981) referred to as the "September Rule":
Any judge who has three or more assigned opinions that have been pending
release for at least six months will not be assigned to sit on any new
cases until such time as his or her backlog has been reduced to include
no more then two cases pending six months.
185. See statutes cited supra note 31.
186. For a discussion of these problems, see, e.g., C. HANDY, supra note
180, at 57-91.
187. 40 Cal. 3d 473, 709 P.2d 852, 220 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1985).
188. Id. at 483, 709 P.2d at 858, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
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in that case.'89 Another example of a case in which the requirements of
an administrative imperative were similarly unclear involved the disciplining
of the Texas Supreme Court justice who had failed to instruct his staff,
as a general matter, that they were subject to the same standards of fidelity
and diligence that applied to the justice. 90
In addition to this ambiguity and lack of clarity as to individual judicial
roles, the dictates of certain judicial roles may sometimes be in conflict.
Perhaps the most obvious example is the potential conflict between the
adjudicatory and the managerial roles. A judge's own expectations or self-
concept may cause him to view the adjudicatory role as paramount, while
important members of the judge's role set may emphasize the judge's
managerial role. A judge in an overburdened court' 9' may find it difficult
to satisfy the dictates of the adjudicatory role and the judge's personal
desire to process cases in a thoughtful, deliberate manner when the judge
knows that important individuals in the judicial bureaucracy expect the
judge to adhere to the production quotas which time standards and expected
case disposition rates impose.
According to role theory, these kinds of ambiguity and conflict should
increase the probability that the judge will experience anxiety and stress.'
Although a certain amount of stress of this sort is to be expected in
conjunction with professional roles in complex organizations and may
actually enhance performance, such stress may be of a level or a kind that
is harmful. 93 Harmful stress, in the organizational context, has been called
role strain, 94 and may lead to lessened organizational effectiveness.19
A conscientious judge in an overburdened court is most likely to
experience role strain. Faced, on the one hand, with a desire to satisfy
the traditional, adjudicatory role by giving careful, thoughtful and deliberate
attention to each case' 96 and, on the other hand, with the need to satisfy
ill-defined production quotas imposed by the judicial bureaucracy, the judge
is caught on the horns of a dilemma. If the judge pursues the adjudicatory
role and develops a case backlog, the judge risks, at best, incurring the
189. Id. at 487, 709 P.2d at 861, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
190. Shaman, supra note 130.
191. See, e.g., supra notes 34-38, 91-95, 115-16 and accompanying text.
192. For a description of the effects of stress in other organizational settings,
see C. HANDY, supra note 180, at 65-72; R. KAHN, D. WOLFE, R. QuiN*, J.
SNOEK, & R. RosENTHAL, ORGANmzAKoNMA STmEss (1964); Rizzo, supra note 181,
at 151.
193. C. HANDY, supra note 180, at 65 ("Stress can be good. Stress can be
bad. Most people need some form of stress to bring out their best performance,
but if the stress is of the wrong form or too much, it becomes damaging.").
194. Id.
195. Rizzo, supra note 181, at 151.
196. For a lengthy description of one scholar's view of the traditional, ad-
judicatory role, see Resnik, supra note 2.
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displeasure of important members of the judge's role set in the judicial
hierarchy, and, at worst, sanctions for failure to process the caseload in
a diligent fashion. If the judge pursues the managerial role and spends
less time than the judge would otherwise devote to individual cases, the
judge risks tarnishing his reputation with lawyers and litigants and lessening
the judge's own self-concept as an adjudicator. The judge also risks making
"bad," unwise, or unjust decisions. The role strain pathology this dilemma
reflects poses a serious challenge for state judicial bureaucracies. It is, at
least, an illness in need of careful examination.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR CASE PRODUCTION LnvuTs
The relatively recent developments of unified state court systems, ad-
ministrative imperatives such as time standards and directive codes of judicial
conduct, and sanctioning mechanisms such as judicial conduct commissions
have converged to create a bureaucratic setting conducive to the pathology
of judicial role strain. In being forced to choose among ambiguous and
conflicting judicial roles, state judges in overburdened courts may be less
than effective in achieving the primary goal of the judicial organization-
that of doing justice in individual cases.
Some commentators likely would assert that the dilemma role strain
pathology poses is irreconcilable. Professor Resnik,197 for example, discusses
adjudicatory and managerial role behaviors as if one role is entirely in-
consistent with the other. Yet, there is a need to develop a theory of the
judicial role that would accommodate the operating realities of the modern
judicial organization. The fact of the matter is that many of today's judges
are faced with the reality of having to process burdensome caseloads with
scarce resources in a bureaucratic setting that sends conflicting and am-
biguous signals. Because state legislative and executive branch officials have
been less than responsive to the need to increase judicial resources to keep
pace with the volume and complexity of modem litigation, 19 the most
feasible approach to addressing the role strain problem would appear to
be that of changing or adjusting the signals sent to judges from within
the judicial bureaucracy.
Given the ways in which the state judiciaries have become bureaucra-
tized, it would seem that we should be looking to the judicial hierarchy
itself to deal with the role strain pathology. Unified court system and
judicial conduct reforms have imposed on many state high courts the key
policymaking role in matters relating to the administration of justice. In
their position as the ultimate administrative authority for their respective
197. Id.
198. For a discussion and analysis of one state's experiences in this regard,
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court systems and the final authority in judicial conduct matters, many
state high courts are in the best position to deal with the role strain
pathology by clarifying ambiguities in managerial and administrative roles
and resolving role conflicts.
As we have seen in our review of the ethics cases involving violations
of administrative imperatives, however, the courts apparently have neither
recognized nor considered the role ambiguities and conflicts facing today's
state judiciaries. Rather, they have tended to decide judicial misconduct
cases on narrow grounds and avoid broad statements of policy that would
assist in clarifying role ambiguities and in resolving role conflicts. Although
the egregious conduct reported in most of the judicial misconduct cases
makes the avoidance of broad statements of policy easy, as Professor Lubet
has pointed out, judicial opinions in ethics cases "[a]s a guide to future
conduct ... are maddeningly unsatisfying." 199 In his excellent critique of
judicial ethics opinions, Lubet contends that the courts have failed to
identify carefully and to analyze closely policy questions and legal principles
in ethics cases, viewing them instead as "distasteful obligations" rather
than "opportunities for helpful explication. ' 200
In light of the pathology of role strain, the need for identification and
deeper analysis of policy questions is particularly important in ethics cases
involving violations of administrative imperatives. State high courts must
begin to recognize that the bureaucratization of their judicial systems may
cause judicial role dysfunctions and pathologies that should be addressed
as a matter of policy by those occupying the highest administrative positions
in the state judicial systems. Ethics cases provide one opportunity to clarify
role ambiguities and to resolve role conflicts by addressing these policy
issues head on.
There are limits, however, to what can be accomplished through ex-
plications of administrative policy in ethics decisions. Although the alle-
gations of judicial misconduct in these cases may be symptomatic of a
role strain pathology that is endemic in a particular judicial system, the
policy guidance that case decisions can offer must, of necessity, be directed
at the behavior of individual judges rather than systemic reform. A court
may announce in deciding such a case, for example, that as a matter of
policy judges will be expected to cope with burdensome caseloads through
the rank ordering of cases for decisional purposes? °' However, the systemic
causes of the role strain problem-heavy workload coupled with draconian
measures such as the withholding of judicial salaries for failure to process
the workload in timely fashion-will still be there. Thus, a different, more
comprehensive, approach to the problem is needed.
199. Lubet, The Search for Analysis in Judicial Ethics or Easy Cases Don't
Make Much Law, 66 NEB. L. REv. 430, 443 (1987).
200. Id. at 436.
201. See, e.g., supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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In court systems in which the role strain pathology is most acute, high
courts should consider the establishment of case production limits through
their rulemaking authority. There is a limit to the number of cases that
an individual judge can handle over a given period of time and still be
expected to do substantial justice in individual cases. Such optimum case
production limits2°2 will no doubt be difficult to calculate because the time
needed to process individual cases necessarily will vary depending on the
nature and complexity of cases. Yet, modem court administration should
have the capacity to establish, at the very least, general estimates of optimal
judicial workloads for particular courts.23
Most state high courts have not only the capacity but the authority,2°4
to take such a positive approach in addressing the role strain problem.
Once they establish production limits through the rulemaking process, state
high courts can reassign judges in courts with less burdensome caseloads
to assist in handling cases in courts in which judicial caseloads have exceeded
production limits. Although the flexibility to adopt such measures to correct
caseload imbalances was cited by early proponents of state court unification O
and no doubt is currently employed by some unified state court systems,
there have been no serious indications of attempts to do so in the context
of previously established case production limits.
State high courts cannot adequately address the role strain problem
unless they take affirmative action to reduce the strain through measures
such as the establishment of case production limits. Although this would
require many high courts to shift their perspective from that of enforcer
of production quotas-as reflected in the cases analyzed in part II-to
creator of production limits, no less is required to provide a bureaucratic
setting in which the need to judge well is reconciled with the need to work
well.
202. A finite limit to the number of decisions that appellate judges can make
without jeopardizing substantive justice is suggested in P. CARRINGTON, D. MEAOR
& M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 143-47 (1976).
203. The development by courts of workload measures, such as a "weighted
caseload system," is discussed in H. LAWSON & B. GLETNE, WommoAD MEASURES
IN rm COURT 51-59 (1980).
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